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Case No. 20080775-CA

IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Spanish Fork City,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Travis Taylor
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of marajuana in a drug free
zone and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, both class A
misdemeanors. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was the warrantless entry by Spanish Fork City police officers and an officer with
the Utah County Sheriffs Department a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution or to Article I § 14 of the Utah State Constitution?
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
is a mixed question of law and fact. The interpretation of the Utah Constitution is a
1

question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Casey, 2002 UT29, ]f 19, 44 P.3d 756.
Other legal conclusions are also reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including the
court's application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^f 11,
103 P.3d 699. The court's underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State
v. Krukowsld 2004 UT 94, ^ 11, 100 P.3d 1222.
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Const. Art. I, § 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence in this matter. The
Defendant argued that the police did not have authority to enter his private residence. The
Plaintiff asserted that law enforcement officers were responding to a dispatch call of a
possible altercation between an unknown number of parties. When police arrived, two
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male suspects exited the home and were asked if other individuals were inside the
residence. When the suspects became non-responsive, and told the officers to find out for
themselves, officers entered the home to look for additional victims and parties to the
altercation, and to ensure officer safety. Once inside the home, officers found marijuana
and drug paraphernalia in plain view in some of the rooms where the altercation was
believed to have taken place. Officers seized the marijuana and drug paraphernalia and
placed the defendant, the owner of the home, under arrest.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that officers' warrantless entry
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
Defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana and drug paraphernalia found in plain view
in Defendant's home. The Defendant then entered a Sery Plea of guilty on both class A
misdemeanor counts, reserving the right to appeal the particular issue of the denial of
defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
B. Statement of Relevant Facts
On November 4, 2007, Officers from Spanish Fork City and one additional officer
from Utah County Sheriffs Department responded to a call referencing an assault in
progress. (Record (R:) 5: 21-25)
The caller was later identified as Defendant's brother, who indicated that "his
brother (namely the defendant) was getting beat up". (R: 28:1-4)
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The dispatch call to officers did not indicate the number of parties involved in the
altercation, but only that a complainant called in to say that his brother was getting beat
up. (R: 6: 10-19 / 28:5-7 / 60:10-17 / 69:4-14).
The police officers arrived at the approximate location of the reported altercation
and identified the home based on distinct sounds of shouting coming from inside the
basement area of Defendant's residence. (R- 7:4-19 / 69:17-19)
The officers reported hearing something or someone being hit against one of the
basement windows and other sounds of something or someone hitting up against a wall.
(R: 7:22-25/59:15-21/70:3-4).
The officers, fearing for the safety of any occupants inside the residence, attempted
to get the attention of the occupants of the residence by knocking on the door. (R: 9:2-6
/70:12-21). Officers noticed there were aggressive dogs in the residence. (R:9:2-6 / 70:2371:4). After a delay, the door was opened by suspect Justin Orner, who allowed some
dogs inside to exit the residence. (R: 9:2-6). The dogs were aggressive towards the
officers. (R:20:12-13 / 61:21-25 /71:11). Officers asked suspect Orner to control the dogs,
which Defendant then did by calling them back inside and taking them to the backyard.
(R:75:l-6).
Officers ordered Mr. Orner to show them his hands and exit the residence. (R: 9:713 111 :6-10). Mr. Orner did not comply on the first request, and only showed his hands on
the second request, but would not come out of the residence (R: 9:11-12 / 61:7-13 /
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71:14-17).
Officers then saw the Defendant and asked him to come outside, which he did.
(R:71:19-25).
Officers then handcuffed both individuals for safety reasons. (R:71:25 - 72:8).
Both individuals were searched for weapons via Terry. (R:77:l l-15).No weapons were
located on either the suspect Justin Orner, or the Defendant. (R:77:l 1-15).
At this time, officers did not know that the noise coming from the home was from
only these two individuals. (R: 10:9-14 /60:2 / 69:13-14 ). Officers asked Defendant and
the other suspect about the events of that evening. Both Defendant and the other suspect
advised that they had been drinking and had returned home, at different times in the night,
and had a verbal altercation (R:18:8 - 12). This verbal altercation then became physical.
Officers asked Defendant if there was anybody else in the house. (R: 9:25- 10:1 / 29:10 14). The Defendant replied that he "wasn't going to tell [the officers], and that they
should go find out for themselves." (R: 23: 13-15/29:10-14/41:7-18).
The officers entered the home for officer safety reasons and to make sure that
noone else was in the residence who was wounded or otherwise injured. (R: 10: 19-20 /
29:21 -30:7/62:22-63:6).
Beyond this simple protective sweep, officers did not conduct a search of the
residence. (R: 10:15-20/30:4-7).
Officers checked areas of the house which were large enough for a person to hide,
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for additional suspects and/or victims.(R: 10:15-20 / 30:4-7 ).
During the sweep, officers found a used glass pipe in plain view on top of a table
in the southeast corner room. (R: 63:18 - 22 / 64:1 -10). Additionally, officers found a
green leafy substance inside of it, which was marijuana, in plain view on top of the table.
(R:32:8-9 / 44:14- 45:9 / 64:12-14 ).
Officers also found several additional glass pipe/; in a desk in the room in the
northwest corner of the basement. (R:30:15-19 / 42:19-22). Officers saw these pipes in
plain view in an opened box in an opened desk compartment, at eye level. (R:30:20-25 /
42:19- 43:3). Officers did not manipulate anything or touch anything in order to see these
pipes. (R: 30:20-25).
Once the officers determined the house was secure and noone else was inside,
officers took all incriminating items into evidence.(R:44:5-14).
Defendant was then read his Miranda rights and questioned about the drugs
.(R:45:10-18).
Defendant admitted he had been smoking the marijuana the previous day
(R:45:17-18). As the suspect residence was the Defendant's, all seized contraband was
charged to him. The second suspect was not charged with any offenses related to the
current case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects only against
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searches which are unreasonable and not supported by either reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. Protective sweep searches are authorized under the Constitution where
they are justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances.
The officers in the present case had probable cause of an assault in progress and
were justified in conducting a sweep search for their own safety as well as the safety of
other persons. While in the home on the sweep, officers observed illegal contraband in
plain view, which was clearly incriminating.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF I HE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND UTAH CONST. ART. I PROTECTS ONLY
AGAINST SEARCHES WHICH ARE REASONABLE AND NOT
SUPPORTED BY EITHER REASONABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE
CAUSE.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution was created to protect

u

[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV see also UTAH
CONST. ART I § 14. Based upon the protections inherent within this well-known clause
and their application to Utah case law, the scope of an officer's authority to conduct a
warrantless search of a residence is not without limitation. As stated by the Utah Court of
Appeals: "[L]aw enforcement officers may neither search nor seize unless they have a
warrant supported by probable cause. Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant
are 'unreasonable per se unless [they] fall within a recognized exception to the warrant

7

requirement of the fourth amendment.'" State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Ut. App.
1995) (citing State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231,1235 (Ut. App. 1989)). But "because the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,' the warrant
requirement is subject to certain exceptions." Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398
(2006). One such exception occurs in the case of exigent circumstances and probable
cause. A warrant is not required when ""the exigencies of the situation' make the needs
of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment."Mincy v.Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 quoting
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
The city submits that the detention of the Defendant and the ultimate sweep of his
residence in the present case was justified as a search supported by probable cause and
exigent circumstances. Ultimately, officers acquired probable cause of a separate
violation (illegal possession of controlled substances and paraphernalia), and a legal
arrest was then affected.
A.

"Protective sweep" searches are authorized under the Constitution
where they are justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances.

The Utah Supreme Court has previously condoned law enforcement use of
"protective sweeps" as a valid exception to the warrant requirement. In State v. Kelly, 718
P.2d 385, 387 (Utah 1986), the Court considered a similar issue which arose when
officers responded to a call of a disturbance inside a residence. They entered the home
and discovered the dead body of a woman who had been stabbed multiple times.
8

Neighbors provided a physical description of a suspect who had walked away from the
apartment building following the disturbance. Officers confirmed in the freshly fallen
snow outside that footprints indeed led away from the scene, and this footprint trail led to
the defendant's home. Id .
Officers made contact with the defendant at his home, and he allowed them inside.
During the course of this encounter, the defendant, who was not fully clothed, walked
back to his bedroom to dress. Though not invited to follow, an officer followed him for
safety reasons and observed in plain view in the defendant's bedroom, clothing which
matched the witness accounts of the murder suspect's clothing. The defendant was
thereafter placed in custody for the homicide, but before leaving his home, officers
conducted a sweep search to determine if anyone else was present. They did not locate
any other individuals, but did see in plain view a pair of gloves which appeared to be
stained with blood in defendant's bathroom. These were seized as evidence, together with
the clothing observed in the defendant's bedroom. Id at 388.
The defendant was convicted at trial, but appealed contesting the warrantless
search of his home. The Court upheld the conviction and the search, holding that "[o]nce
in the house, the officer was fully justified in following defendant into the bedroom. A
police officer may 'take necessary measures to neutralize [a] threat of harm[.]'" Id at 389.
(Quoting State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 124 (1983)). Further, the Court determined that
walking through the home to search for other persons was proper: "Such action is known
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as a protective sweep and has been upheld as a security measure." Id at 391. The searches
being valid, the plain view doctrine applied, allowing the admission of the seized items.
Id
The "protective sweep" search as defined in Kelly was followed by State v.
Johnsen, 1999 Ut. App. 113 (Utah App 1999). Citing the earlier Utah Supreme Court
Kelly decision, the Johnsen Court defined two prerequisites in a proper sweep search: (1)
probable cause and (2) exigent circumstances:

The trial court properly determined, under the totality of the circumstances,
the officers had probable cause to believe that criminal activity, potentially
burgJary, trespass, and jJJegaJ drug use, was ongoing or had been committed
inside the apartment. The trial court also properly determined that the
occupants' flight, the possible destruction of evidence and a legitimate
threat to officer safety by unknown persons still inside, provided exigent
circumstances to justify the warrantless entry into the apartment. Thus, both
probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the protective sweep of
the apartment. Id at 117-118.
More recently, the United States Supreme Court considered the warrantless entry
into a home in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 398. In Stuart, law enforcement
entered a residence after observing an ongoing brawl through a window. Officers, who
were unable to stop the fight after yelling through the doorway, proceeded to enter the
kitchen. Several occupants were charged with various offenses related to the incident. Id.
The Court upheld the warrantless entry, holding that "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment
required [officers] to wait until another blow rendered someone unconscious or semiconscious or worse before entering. The role of a peace officer includes preventing
10

violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties; an officer is not
like a boxing or hockey referee, poised to stop a bout only if it becomes too one-sided. Id
at 7.
In State v. Comer, 2002 UT 219, 51 P.3d 55, officers responded to a citizen
complaint of a "family fight in progress." Id at 2. When the wife answered the door, the
officers told her that they were there to investigate the report and asked if anyone else was
inside. Id. After the wife told the officers her husband was inside, "she made a somewhat
sudden and unexplained retreat into the house." Id at 5. The wife did not admit to any
fight. Nevertheless, the report, combined with the wife's unexplained retreat, was
sufficient to establish probable cause of domestic violence and justify immediate entry. Id
at 23.
In State v. Vallasenor-Meza, 2005 UT App 65, 108P.3d 123, police responded on a
report that defendant was "beating the crap" our of the caller's sister. When police arrived
at the trailer home, defendant stuck his head out the door, admitted that there had been a
fight, but said that it ended. Id at 3. The responding officer asked defendant to let him in
so that he could confirm the safety of both parties, but defendant refused. Id. Defendant
seemed very guarded about what was behind the door, consistently keeping one arm
behind the door. Id. The officers asked defendant to show his hands but defendant
refused. Id. Only after an officer drew his weapon and ordered defendant to show his
hands did defendant step out of the trailer and show his hands. Id. However, defendant
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kept putting his hands in his pockets and then refused to answer any more questions. Id.
The officers then frisked defendant for weapons and asked if anyone was in the trailer. Id.
Defendant first responded "Yes", but when asked again, denied that anyone was in the
trailer. Id. An officer then went inside the home to check on the welfare of the caller's
sister but found no one home. Id. The court in this case concluded that "[t]he officers
legitimately feared for the safety of the victim and were justified in their concern and
actions "based on the brother's report and defendant's suspicious body movements,
contradictory answers and unwillingness to cooperate." Id at 18. Compare State v. Davis.
295 OR. 227, 66P.2d 802, 812 (1983)(en banc) where evidence seized in warrantless
entry was suppressed where police entered a motel room after establishing the safety of
the victim.
In the present case, law enforcement lacked specific knowledge about how
many suspects they would be facing at the residence, and whether there were weapons
present. Officers knew there was a physical fight, but their testimony was that the
original dispatch broadcast on the police radio did not provide a specific number of
people involved. The complaining party was either unaware or did not disclose how many
people were engaged in the fight or whether weapons were being used. He advised police
simply that his brother was being "beat up".
It is the absence of information that makes a call such as this so dangerous. Law
enforcement are responding to an unknown party's residence with no knowledge of
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possible weapons, how many suspects they may encounter, or other hazards. The court
notes that, in the present case, each officer described their surprise in dealing with two
large dogs which bounded out of the house, threatening those who were attempting to
secure the perimeter. The call had offered no warning about possible animals, yet the
officers had to deal with that unexpected situation as it arose.
Officers were also forced to deal with the possibility of other individuals, either
perpetrators or victims, inside the home. They attempted to resolve these concerns in a
non-intrusive manner by questioning the Defendant once he was secured outside. Law
enforcement officer's testimony was consistent that when they asked the defendant about
whether others were inside, he was uncooperative and responded simply that he wasn't
going to tell and that they should find out for themselves. Officer Gordon testified that,
had the defendants told officers at that time that noone else was in the house, that they
would have recognized him as being cooperative, accepted that answer, and not entered
the home in search of anyone else. Hence, the defendant's own behavior was a significant
factor that weighed into law enforcement's need to perform a protective sweep.

B.

The officers in the present case had probable cause of an assault in
progress and were justified in conducting a sweep search for their own
safety as well as the safety of other persons.

The present case is comparable to the scenarios presented supra', in these
warrantless entry cases where protective sweeps have been allowed, each have similar
elements of residential disturbances and officer safety concerns. As in Kelly, Johnsen,
13

Comer , Vallasenor-Meza and Stuart, both probable cause and exigent circumstances
exist to justify the warrantless entry. The subsequent walk-through search officers made
into Defendant's home is then supported by the exigent safety concern, as upheld in Kelly
and Johnsen.
In terms of officer safety exigency, the United States Supreme Court has held that
exigent circumstances exist when "specific and articulable facts..., taken together with
rational inferences from those facts," reasonably warrant an officer in believing that a
detained suspect is armed and dangerous, Terry v.Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21,30 (1968)
(weapons frisk), that an occupant of a vehicle "is dangerous and

may gain immediate

control of weapons." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983) (protective
search of an automobile), or that the home of an arrestee "harbors an individual posing a
danger to those on the arrest scene," Maryland v Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990)
(protective sweep).
Exigent entries are also justified by the need "to render emergency assistance to an
injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury." Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403.
Under this "emergency aid" exigency, law enforcement officers may enter a home
without a warrant if those officers have a "objectively reasonable basis" for believing that
immediate entry is necessary "to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened
with such injury." Id at 406, 403. The Supreme Court in Stuart explained that entry "is
'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of
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mind, 'as long as the circumstances viewed objectively, justify [the] action.'" Id at 404
(quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). Moreover, an officer's acts
must "be evaluated in relation to the scene as it reasonably appeared to the officer at the
time, cnot as it may seem to a scholar after the event with the benefit of leisured
retrospective analysis.'" State v. Lynd, 771 P.2d 770, 773 (Wash. App. 1989).
Other jurisdictions have argued under probable cause and exigency standards that
warrantless searches must be narrowly drawn to cover investigation of serious crimes
only, excluding investigation of misdemeanor events. See e.g. State v. Guertin, 190
Conn. 440, 453, 461 A.2d 963, 970 (1983). While persuasive albeit not controlling
authority in our jurisdiction, the officers conduct must be viewed in light of circumstances
as they are in the moment. Stuart at 404. In the present case, officers were not entering the
home to look for contraband, but rather to ensure their personal safety as well as the
safety of potential victims still inside.
Contrary to Defendant's claims on appeal, the police officer's entry in the present
case was justified under both officer safety and emergency aid definitions of the exigent
circumstances exception. The circumstances at the time were more than sufficient to
provide the officers with an "objectively reasonable basis" for believing the immediate
entry was necessary to prevent serious harm to others or to self. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403,
406. As stated previously, the officers would have been derelict in their duty had they not
intervened.

15

In the present case, officers responded to a call of a physical altercation in
progress, and confirmed when they arrived that a fight was ongoing inside the suspect
residence. Law enforcement could discern shouting coming from the basement area, as
well as a disturbing noise, which sounded like a person being thrown against a window.
The officer's observations, having confirmed the original complaint, without
question rise to the level of probable cause. Moreover, it is important to note that the
officers did not immediately charge into the residence. As with the officers in the Stuart
case, they first attempted the less-intrusive measure of making contact with the occupants
at the door. The Defendant and a second male did answer the door and ultimately
complied with a request from officers to step outside the home. However, when
questioned about the possibility of other occupants inside the residence, both suspects
refused to comply. Neither male present with officers would confirm or deny whether or
not anyone else was inside the home.
This situation created a dilemma for law enforcement. Without the cooperation of
the Defendant, they could not determine whether the situation which had required their
presence was in control. If there was an individual inside who had been injured in the
assault, emergency aid could be necessary and failure to give aid to that person could
result in serious injury or death, and the City and the Police Department might be held
liable for that circumstance. Alternatively, the true assailant could still be inside the
home, waiting to attack either the suspects or the investigating officers. Safety is a
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primary concern for all officers, particularly when responding to an unknown residence
where an assault is already in progress. Any number of factors could arise to create a
hazardous situation for those present, including the possible use of deadly weapons. As
stated by the Kelly court: "A police officer may 'take necessary measures to neutralize [a]
threat of harm[.]'" Kelly, 718 P.2d at 389, quoting State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 124
(1983). The Defendant's refusal to answer law enforcement's questions made entry into
the home necessary in order to provide for the safety of all present.
C.

The protective sweep was limited to those areas of the home which were large
enough for a person to hide or be found.
The United States Supreme Court outlined the proper scope of a protective sweep

in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). In upholding the use of protective sweep
searches, the Court first noted the circumstances which gave rise to the search. Officers
were investigating an armed robbery which had occurred two days previously. Two males
were suspected in the incident, one of which was described as wearing a red running suit.
Law enforcement believed the defendant was involved and they were able to obtain a
warrant for his arrest. Id 328.
Officers proceeded to the defendant's home to execute the arrest warrant. The
police department had phoned his residence to confirm that he was home and had spoken
to both the defendant and an unidentified woman. There was no information that the
second robbery suspect, or any other party, was in the residence. Once at the home, law
enforcement was able to coax the defendant outside, where he was placed into custody.
17

At that point, although the defendant was secured and no longer in the residence, one
officer went inside to conduct a protective sweep. He then observed a red running suit
which matched the description of the clothing of the robber. The suit was seized and used
as evidence at the defendant's subsequent trial. The defendant appealed his ultimate
conviction, arguing that the protective sweep of his home was improper. Id at 329.
The Buie Court rejected the defendant's claim and held that the protective sweeps
were a valid exception to the warrant requirement. In so holding, the Court stated:

In Terry and Long, we were concerned with the immediate interest of the
police officers in taking steps to assure themselves that the persons with
whom they were dealing were not armed with, or able to gain immediate
control of, a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
them. In the instant case, there is an analogous interest of the officers in
taking steps to assure themselves that the house in which a suspect is being,
or has just been, arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous
and who could unexpectedly launch an attack. The risk of danger in the
context of an arrest in the home is as great as, if not greater than, it is in an
on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter. A Terry or Long frisk
occurs before a police-citizen confrontation has escalated to the point of
arrest. A protective sweep, in contrast, occurs as an adjunct to the serious
step of taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a
crime. Moreover, unlike an encounter on the street or along a highway, an
in-home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his
adversary's "turf'. Id at 333.
The court stressed the importance of balancing the reasonableness of the entry by
the officers with the rights of the defendant, stating that a "protective sweep, aimed at
protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the circumstances, is nevertheless not a full
search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where
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a person may be found." Id at 335. So while limiting the scope of the protective sweep,
the Court clearly upheld its use: "The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited
protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer
possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be
swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." Id at 336-337.
In the present case, not knowing who else was inside the residence, officers
conducted a protective sweep of the residence, limited only to those spaces where a
person could be hiding or where a person could be laying down. Law enforcement
officer's testimony is consistent that nothing was touched or manipulated during the
course of the protective sweep. The city again maintains their argument that officers did
not enter the home to search for drugs, rather the officers only entered the home to
confirm the safety of any potential victims and for officer safety reasons.
II.

THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AT THE DEFENDANT'S HOME IS
ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
The City submits that the property seized at the Defendant's residence, while

collected absent a warrant, is admissible under the well-established plain view doctrine.
Three requirements are necessary to justify a seizure under this rule: "(1) lawful presence
of the officer; (2) evidence in plain view; and (3) evidence that is clearly incriminating."
State v. Caver. 814 P.2d 604, 610-611 (Ut. App. 1991).
In the present case, the City asserts that the first prong of plain view doctrine was
met given that the officers were lawfully present inside the residence to perform a
19

protective sweep. Officers consistently testified that they looked only in places which
were large enough for a person to hide, such as inside closets, under desks and behind
doors. Officers had stooped to look inside the recessed bottom of a desk and in standing
up, noted a box that was opened in a compartment on the desk. The compartment was
opened, providing officers with an unobstruced view of its contents. The contents were
multiple marijuana pipes, which were clearly visible without officer manipulation of the
box in any way. Furthermore, additional marijuana and paraphernalia were seen in sitting
on top of a table in a second room in open view, as required by the second prong of the
plain view doctrine. The City submits that marijuana and drug paraphernalia are the type
of item that is clearly incriminating, such that no further investigation was required to
determine their criminal nature. This satisfies the third prong of the plain view doctrine.
The officers did not stop to collect these incriminating items during the course of
the walk through of Defendant's home. Such actions may have transformed a proper,
protective sweep into a warrantless investigatory search. Instead they completed their
walk-through of the home and satisfied their safety concerns that no other persons
remained inside. Only then did they collect the clearly incriminating items which they had
observed in plain view.
Accordingly, the seizure of this evidence fits within the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement. Id.

III.

CONCLUSION
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The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects only against
searches which are unreasonable and not supported by probable cause and exigent
circumstances. Protective sweep searches are however, authorized under the Constitution
where they are justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Both existed in the
current case. Enforcement officers responded to a residential disturbance detail at the
Defendant's home where an assault was reported to be ongoing. Officers were not aware
at the time they arrived, that the assault was limited to two parties. Once on the scene,
officers confirmed through their own observations that an assault was in progress. While
officers were able to secure the defendant and a second suspect outside, they were not
able to elicit information about whether other individuals remained inside. When asked if
other individuals were inside the residence, Defendant stated he would not tell them, and
told them to find out for themselves. The risk of the unknown created an exigency which
required warrantless entry into the home. Once lawfully present inside the residence, law
enforcement is permitted to seize clearly incriminating evidence which is in plain view,
such as the marijuana and paraphernalia, which have been charged against the Defendant
in this case. For these reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm Defendant's
convictions.
Respectfully submitted May 13 2009.
Kirk R Nord
(
Spanish Fork City Attorney
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